Introduction
Central bank independence has for many years now been popular, seen as being not only associated with but actually contributing to low inflation. The modernday pioneer in establishing an independent central bank with a focus on inflation was New Zealand. There a new central bank constitution was passed into law in 1988, and that constitution gave the central bank the primary objective of low inflation. 1 This was preceded by a considerable amount of work by economists which showed that central bank independence was associated with low inflation, and by some theoretical work which demonstrated that central bank independence would lead to, in the sense of cause, low inflation. There was the occasional partial dissent -Adam Posen (1993) , for example, maintained that central bank independence and low inflation were in fact simultaneously produced by the structure of a country's financial system; but no-one disputed that there was correlation. The starting point for this paper is a neglected aspect of that body of work; we focus on small open economies.
The reason for doing so is as follows. In a previous study (Capie and Wood, 2014 forthcoming) we argued that crises inevitably compromise central bank independence, as response to the crisis involves changes to the law governing the central bank. This was supported by evidence from several countries and over two centuries. But every country examined was, at least by the standards of the time, large. Why do we consider that small open economies might be different?
At first glance one might expect the finding to hold there too. By their nature such economies are particularly exposed to shocks. Terms of trade shocks have a substantial effect in a small economy. If the exchange rate is fixed they have a fluctuating price level, and if the exchange rate is floating, while a stable price level can be maintained the exchange rate will by its fluctuations affect particular sectors of the economy and produce cries for action by and from politicians. But we nevertheless consider that such economies may be more successful at retaining a stable central bank constitution aimed at maintaining low inflation.
The argument is straightforward and its essence can be stated briefly. It relies on two propositions. First, the more detailed is a law the less likely it is to be capable of covering all contingencies. Second, high trust societies function more efficiently than low trust societies because in the former transactions costs, in the widest sense, are lower. The next section of this paper develops these points to show the argument in full. We then turn to how well our analytical conclusions conform with any patterns there may be in the data. The penultimate section analyses and compares results across several small open economies (New Zealand, Australia, and Spain) and considers our argument in a tentative way in relation to Norway (comparative ignorance limits our capacity to take it further). The final section of the paper comprises an overview followed by a few remarks on whatever policy implications we think can be drawn from our work. There are also three appendices.
But before proceeding further we must dispose of two misconceptions. Fixed and floating exchange-rate regimes are often seen as alternatives, the adoption of which depends on the confidence there is in the monetary authorities of a country to behave properly. They are alternatives in the sense that either one delivers balance of payments equilibrium. A floating exchange rate is more likely to be adopted by a country with a reputation for sound monetary management. A fixed rate is likely to be more appealing to a country seeking to establish such a reputation. For a country with a floating exchange rate there is no exchange rate policy -it looks after itself. An independent monetary policy can be employed. Under truly fixed rates the exchange rate is the target and there is no monetary policy, with monetary conditions determined through the balance of payments.
But Friedman showed that there was an important third type of regime, pegged rates, sometimes called 'fixed-but-adjustable' rates. Under this regime there can be some attempt at monetary policy at the same time as the exchange rate is being targeted. With pegged rates the monetary base has both domestic and foreign components. In some cases this last was effectively implicit in the working of the different exchange equalization accounts. If capital flows were considered excessive there would be an attempt at sterilizing the inflow 2 .
Central bank independence is just as likely to prevail when there is an exchange-rate target in place. Such a target is given in a fixed rate regime but could also be employed in a regime of floating rates or of pegged or adjustable.
Thus under the gold standard there was an exchange-rate target and a central bank might be entrusted to pursue the policies that ensured the currency was kept at parity. The same was true under Bretton Woods, although as noted there might well be both some monetary policy and some exchange-rate targeting. In fact central banks have mostly been happy with and even preferred exchangerate targets since they give the banks more obvious power and prestige. (Johnson, 1969) But nowadays most central banks have an inflation target largely because of a preference for floating rates that evolved after the breakdown of Bretton Woods.
Further, there is currently no obvious anchor for the system, no dominant country whose monetary policy others could happily follow 3 .
The second misconception is the far from rare assertion that small open economies are price takers, with the inference that their price level and inflation rate are determined outside their borders. We reject that and agree with Mervyn King, the former Governor of the Bank of England (2003 England ( -2013 3 In an earlier paper (Capie, Mills, and Wood, 1994) we examined the evidence on central bank independence, first reviewing and comparing previous studies and then extending the work back in time. We recognised, following Friedman, that so-called fixed exchange-rate regimes are seldom truly and rigidly fixed. Rather, in practice they allow some latitude for domestic monetary policy. Looking back into the pegged-rate period found the association between central bank independence and low inflation broadly confirmed.
Why Size Matters: Conventions, Trust, and the Role of Law
The claim that "my country is special" is in general a dubious one. The law that establishes the central bank could, for example, say that the bank can conduct monetary policy in any way it likes to achieve any end it wishes; or at perhaps the opposite extreme could say that the bank must conduct policy in a way prescribed by the government to achieve an objective chosen by the government, but that it is independent to choose, for example, the colour of the coats its doormen wear. The model he used in his discussion was one where the bank had a target chosen by the government but was free to operate as it wished to achieve that target. In such a society there would be no laws. The conventions evolved -no laws set them out -and no laws are needed to enforce them. The central bank itself would be constrained purely by convention to produce low inflation. No contract would be needed to enjoin that. The central bank would aim at low inflation because of the proven benefits of doing so, and the notion of formal contracts is foreign to the society. In such a society, then, there would be no 5 The best discussions of this evolutionary process which are known to the authors are the Mais Lecture given at Cass Business School by Frederick Hayek shortly before his death -for which reason it regrettably remains unpublished -and Jonathan Sacks's "Markets, Governments, and Virtues", of 2001. 6 The evolution of common and shared norms, institutions, and values in a virtuous society was described by Adam Smith in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments" (1759). By their nature, he maintained, human beings while self-interested are also genuinely social actors. They have sympathy for others and care for them, and so are able to learn from their own personal experience which acts are compatible with the well-being of others and of the society as a whole, and which are harmful and therefore should not be pursued. This, Smith argued, is the very basis of virtue in society. The particular relevance of this to small societies was urged in a subsequent edition. In the 1790 edition Smith included a new book, book VI, where he studied "Virtue". Section ii therein discusses "The character of the individual, so far as it can affect the happiness of other people". There Smith underlines the gradations of affection, care and attention individuals give to others, with different intensity depending on how near they are to them, starting with family and ending with country and humanity. How might we expect the central bank contract in such a "high trust" (but not completely virtuous) society to be written?
It could be written loosely. That is to say, the preference for low inflation might be expressed in it for convenience, and as a precaution permission to act as lender of last resort in a crisis could be there for the avoidance of doubt when action is urgent, as it is in a crisis 7 . In addition, a tolerance range around which inflation was allowed to fluctuate might be expressed, if economic knowledge (which term we assume for the sake of discussion not to be an oxymoron) allowed that to be done. Otherwise, the only reason for it would be to help people form their expectations. The contract would be free of detailed instructions, since the central bank would be trusted to do the right thing as best it could.
Our argument on the importance of trust has implications for the resilience of central bank independence in the face of shocks. Let us briefly repeat our earlier argument as to why central bank independence seems inevitably to be compromised by a crisis. Central bank independence, we suggested, requires a well-defined contract. It is impossible to write a complete contingent contract.
Hence at some time a crisis occurs which is not anticipated in the contract. The contract therefore requires modification, and there is then scope for the government implicitly or explicitly to claim that it has no choice but to interfere with some aspect of the bank's contractual independence. This conclusion was supported by the examples we studied in our forthcoming paper (Capie and Wood, 2014) . But these examples were from "normal" societies. Certainly they
were not ones where the rule of law had broken down, but nor were they ones where trust is unusually high by the standards of developed nations.
That particular problem occurs, though, only because the contract was detailed.
A contract scarcer in detail would allow a central bank much greater discretion, and thus greater freedom to respond as seemed best to previously completely unforeseen events. The contract would not require updating after a crisis, so there would be no scope for the compromising of independence. These seem to us to be the implications for central bank independence of being in a high trust society. How do these implications bear on the present study? Because, we would argue, of the kind of societies most likely to be high trust.
High Trust Societies.
You may not actively distrust someone you do not know. But trust is much more likely among people who know each other, and have reason for trust. We can imagine groups of people who know each other, and who trust each other as a consequence of regular interactions. These networks can extend, as the groups will not be closed. Each member, or at any rate most, will know individuals outside the group. People who live in a village nowadays will know people outside the village. The network of trust will thus extend, and could extend across the whole society. It would be self-reinforcing because self-rewarding behaviour if it did, because it would reduce the costs of transacting, by for example reducing the amount of pre-contract diligence which it seemed necessary to undertake.
Such a network of interlinked trust groups could not extend across the whole of the UK, for example. Accordingly, high trust societies will be small societies. Hence small open economies, exposed to crises as they are, may nonetheless have central banks which if independent retain that independence through crises. Does the evidence support this conclusion? Or do they lose that independence and revert to high and perhaps variable inflation?
What does "Small and Open" Mean in Practice?
The use of large and small in the international trade literature is usually taken to mean the ability or not to change a country's terms of trade. A large country is defined as one that can change its terms-of-trade and a small country one that cannot. So, for example, to pick up on a recently spotted instance of that view, Dannhauser (2013) writes that the usual "….assumption of a 'small' economy will be maintained, i.e. we abstract from economies, such as the USA, that have sufficient market power to influence prices in world markets for internationally traded goods." But the definition which that quotation implies might well result in all countries being classified as small. It is difficult to find a country that can change its terms-of-trade in anything more than a very limited range of products. How much influence does the US have in world markets and how many others like her could there be? Similarly, at the other end of the spectrum a small country that supplied the world with say, a rare mined metal is likely to have greater influence on world prices than most other countries. Almost all countries could therefore be categorised as small in the common international trade sense. It might be more useful in the present context simply to consider some measure of absolute size on the grounds that absolute size is what matters in the present context since it is that, given openness, which determines the importance of shocks of any given size to the price level. But openness is key.
Closed economies can do as they wish and lose their interest for us in this sense.
Measuring Openness
How Where N is domestic output not exported and Pn is the general price level. Beenstock and Warburton (1983) , however, showed just how greatly prices mattered in that calculation. If import prices rose the ratio rose whereas if the non-traded prices rose the ratio fell, and if export prices rose the effect was ambiguous. Moreover, 'most leverage of price movements with respect to R1
will occur through changes in Pm and Pn rather than Px'. They then showed that removing price changes resulted in a substantially different picture of openness for both the US and the UK over the century prior to 1980.
It is thus clear that our results might be critically dependent on a particular measure of openness: an unsatisfactory situation. Fortunately, it is possible in the context we are working to reject some openness measures a priori. The argument is as follows. Our concern is with the shocks (crises) which can affect a country from overseas. It does not matter for our purposes whether the shock is purely nominal -a price change only -or a purely real one such as the vanishing of a market for a country's goods (an example is the kind of shock
Finland experienced with the collapse of the Soviet Union). Hence we can consider both real and nominal shocks without distinguishing between them, and need not make the "Grassman Adjustment". 9 The next stage is therefore to identify the countries we are to call small and open.
The Data and the Methods
In the spirit of Capie and Wood (1994 op. cit.) we consider a long run of data.
Observations are for seventeen countries, comprising the current G10 and seven others. The data points are generally every five years, adjusting slightly to omit 9 It is customary when discussing shocks to distinguish not only between real and nominal shocks, which we maintain we need not do in the present context, but also between permanent and transitory ones and between anticipated and unanticipated ones. We do not make the former distinction either, on the grounds that when the shock actually occurs, and that is usually when any policy response is made, it is not possible to decide whether a shock is permanent or transitory. One might say in objection that some shocks are obviously transitory -a war, for example. But precedent suggests that even in that context transitory can mean up to 30 years. And as for the claim that with modern technology wars will inevitably be short, that may well have been said at the start of the Thirty Years War. Nor does the usual anticipated/unanticipated distinction matter, for it would affect only the timing of any government response.
the years of the First and Second World Wars. Thus, starting at 1890, the points are 1890, 1895,…1910, 1913, 1919, 1924…, 1938, 1948, 1953……, 2008 . We end at 2008 to avoid the financially turbulent following five years.
As well as real GDP, openness, inflation (as measured by a retail price index appropriate to each country), central bank independence, and an index of economic freedom. The central bank independence measure comes from Capie and Wood (1991) , and is supplemented where necessary by that produced by Alex Cukierman et al (1992) . We use the latest available index of economic freedom (Prados 2014) . These data are in an appendix to the paper, in the above order, in a series of tables. The sources for the other data are given in appendix three.
Next comes how to decide which economies we regard as small and open. The procedure is as follows. We construct a series of diagrams, one for data up to Additionally, the average rate of inflation for all the other countries is given to allow some comparison. Capie and Wood (1991) . GDP in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars (*) Legal Central Bank independence following Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) . We have adopted 0.50 as the threshold for a central bank to be defined as independent We posited at the outset that high trust societies were likely to function more efficiently than other societies and that high trust was more likely to be found in small open economies. At this point we wish to add tentatively that economic freedom will be found to be greater in these same small open societies; and that better inflation performance should be found in the economies with greater economic freedom. This would remain conjecture were it not for the recent availability of an historical index of economic freedom produced by Leandro Prados. There are some such indexes that cover the second half of the twentieth century. Prados has extended these back to the middle of the nineteenth century.
That allows us at least to make a start on testing the hypothesis. All the cautions on the indexes apply as usual.
The main caution to bear in mind in this case is that the indexes of economic freedom are constructed using many of the indicators that we have used implicitly for high trust societies. We would in any case expect freedom to be associated with small open economies and so expect some confirmation of the previous results.
The first step was to examine the rank correlations for economic freedom and inflation in our four sub-periods. The results are not strong but in three of the four sub-periods a negative sign is obtained. That is, if you like, a positive! It is what we expect. The less economic freedom there is the more inflation there is.
The relationship is strongest of all in the 1953-1978 period, something to which we return.
We next calculated correlation coefficients for the raw annual data. Again it was for the second half of the twentieth century that the strongest results were found.
In fact stronger results were found for both periods: 1953-1978 was -.875 and 1983-2008 was -.287 . These results are broadly supportive of our earlier position but we would not want to make too much of them. They do raise a number of questions. Our first conjecture at this stage is that the period 1953-1978 was one generally of financial repression with exchange controls in particular being highly restrictive. And with the Bretton Woods arrangements in place together these might explain much of the better inflation performance.
As far as the earlier periods go it could be argued that for the interwar years there was greatly diminished economic freedom and that the mix of hyperinflation and deflation experience distorts the overall results. For the gold standard years again inflation was pinned down and not necessarily closely related to economic freedom.
Some Examples of Contracts.
In this section we examine the contracts of individual central banks that are of answer is an emphatic no. For details of the contract see Capie and Wood (1994, op cit) or Wood (1994) . But although New Zealand is we maintain a high trust society in general, when the contract was put in place (1989) it was a low trust society as far as monetary policy went. For the preceding government had become notorious for the politicisation of all aspects of economic policy, including monetary policy, and there was strong desire to ensure that could not readily be done again. The contract was drawn tightly and in a way manifestly intended to make government interference in monetary policy not impossiblethat would be undesirable in a democracy -but certainly difficult.
Britain is interesting as an example of a society which, while not low trust by any means, did not satisfy the conditions expected to be a high trust one either. for the stagflation of the 1970s. There followed a period until the 1990s during which policy lacked coordination. There was a slow acceptance of the need for monetary discipline. Monetary targeting was adopted after 1976 (and abandoned in 1985) . By the late 1980s the Bank was being criticised for allowing an asset bubble to develop, for lacking a clear monetary framework, and being insufficiently independent to carry out monetary policy.
By the early 1990s the requisite independence was acquired, inflation was brought under control and inflation targeting was being followed. (Cornish, 2010) This independence has survived.
Our inclination is to put Australia in the high trust category (in stark contrast to the U.S. with its rules and litigation). There is co-operation between the RBA and the APRA consistent with institutions being more resilient when shocks occur.
The Even though a private bank, the Banco de España remained under the influence of the Government, which appointed the Governor, and its main activity was the provision of credit to the State. Given the weak fiscal position of the State, the need for more borrowing from the Bank continued. With the preparations to join the Latin Monetary Union, Spain launched the Peseta as the national currency in 1868 and adopted a bimetallic monetary system; however, the successive running of both public and trade deficits led to the abandonment of gold (but not silver) convertibility very soon in 1883.
The modernisation of the Bank came as a result of the 1921 Banking Act.
Rather than financing the State by purchasing its debt directly, private banks (a select group of them) were given more advantageous credit facilities from the including the ability to read Norwegian. We note only that independence has survived.
Conclusions
Low inflation is clearly associated with independent central banks. But why?
The Barro and Gordon (1983) This emphasis on the notion that the kind of central bank contract that a society has is in part endogenous to the nature of a society is reinforced by our discussion of four special cases all of which show that contracts depend substantially on the circumstances in which they came about.
Accordingly, we conclude with some confidence that central bank independence is much more likely to be durable in small open economies than in large economies, regardless of the degree of openness of the latter. This can be further tested when banking systems and the central banks at the heart of them have settled down after the recent crisis -but that is still some time off.
As so often, some work by Milton Friedman provides an insight into this matter.
In his He goes on to observe that governments often got involved in such a standard by being assigned or assuming "the function of stamping the weight or fineness of the metal", although it could be done privately. Keeping such a standard purely metallic, however, involves considerable resource use (see pages 5-6 of the volume for his calculations), so a fiduciary element is introduced. Now, he observes, there is a role for the government to enforce the convertibility contracts. If the currency evolves further, to a purely fiduciary one, then overissue would lead to a situation where it was once again a "purely commodity standard", as there was "...no equilibrium price level short of that at which the money value of currency is no greater than that of the paper it contains". (p 7)
Hence he concludes that there must be an "external limit" to maintain the value of such a fiduciary currency, because "...competition does not provide an effective limit".
Note that this conclusion depends crucially on the assumption that without a law to constrain over -issue, it will occur because "...any individual issuer has an incentive to issue additional amounts". That is the essence of his argument. Huw Pil and Frank Smets make three observations relevant to our work:
"malfunctioning" of capital markets has contributed to the length and depth of the current recession, and that dealing with these malfunctions will help recovery: second, that the "solid anchoring" of inflation expectations was stabilising in the crisis, and that therefore not only should price stability remain the focus of monetary policy but that it is worth considering moving to a target which does not automatically forgive previous target misses: and third that as In summary, the book reinforces our opening conjecture that in some respects small open economies are "special". 
